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Abstract 
Few studies have investigated individual differences in susceptibility to inattentional 
blindness, a phenomenon where people fail to notice fully visible but unexpected objects when 
they are engaged in an attention-demanding task. In the present study, we explored whether 
different dimensions of psychopathology (i.e., anxious arousal, worry, and depression), trait 
affect, and perceived control of cognition and emotion predicted noticing of an unexpected, non-
emotional object. Results indicated that none of the measures included predicted noticing. 
Implications and suggestions for future research are discussed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 People often fail to notice fully visible but unexpected objects when they are engaged in 
an attention-demanding task.  Across a wide range of tasks and situations, a surprisingly large 
percentage of people experience this “inattentional blindness.” It occurs for both simple (Mack & 
Rock, 1998) and complex (Simons & Chabris, 1999) unexpected objects, and generalizes from 
the laboratory to naturalistic (Haines, 1991) or real-world contexts (Chabris et al, 2012; Hyman 
et al, 2010). In most inattentional blindness studies, some people notice and others do not, raising 
a fundamental question: What factors affect noticing? Research addressing this question has 
adopted two approaches: (a) explore the task parameters that affect noticing rates, or (b) examine 
whether some individuals or groups of people are more likely than others to notice. 
 Many task and display-related factors influence the rate of noticing. For example, 
noticing rates are greater for unexpected objects falling near the focus of attention (Mack & 
Rock, 1998; Newby & Rock, 1998; Most et al, 2000) as well as for objects that look similar to 
the attended items in the display (Most et al, 2001; Simons & Chabris, 1999). In effect, when the 
unexpected object falls within the focus of attention, either spatially or featurally, people are 
more likely to notice it. Moreover, increasing the demands of the primary task reduces noticing 
rates (Simons & Chabris, 1999; Simons & Jensen, 2009; Bredemeier et al, 2012; Cartwright-
Finch & Lavie, 2007). When people devote more effort to the primary task, they are less able to 
detect unexpected events.  
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 Unlike task-related contributors to noticing, individual differences in noticing rates have 
been surprisingly understudied, perhaps because of the nature of the task itself. Inattentional 
blindness studies, by definition, focus on noticing of unexpected objects. Once participants know 
to look for the unexpected, the nature of the task itself has changed, making repeated testing for 
stable individual differences problematic. Rather than looking for reliable individual differences 
in noticing across trials, most individual difference studies have looked across participants for 
associations between noticing and other variables. Evidence for such differences has been mixed.  
 Most individual difference studies have focused on the link between cognitive abilities 
and noticing (e.g., working memory, perceptual speed). A few studies find that greater working 
memory capacity is associated with noticing (e.g., Richards et al., 2010), but others find no 
relation (e.g., Bredemeier & Simons, 2012). Individual differences in other cognitive functions 
(e.g., inhibition, shifting) are unrelated to noticing (Richards et al., 2010; Bredemeier & Simons, 
2012). Similarly, individual differences in the ability to track moving objects effectively do not 
predict noticing (Simons & Jensen, 2009; Bredemeier & Simons, 2012). Together, the lack of a 
reliable relationship between cognitive abilities and noticing is consistent with a dissociation 
between the detection of expected and unexpected items. Individual differences in cognitive 
abilities predict noticing of attended and expected items as well as the ability to perform focused 
attention tasks, but they do not seem to predict noticing of unexpected items falling outside the 
focus of attention.   
 Although a growing number of studies have explored the links between cognitive abilities 
and noticing, relatively few studies have explored whether non-cognitive factors (e.g., 
personality, anxiety) predict inattentional blindness. Such personality factors might hold more 
3 
 
promise as an explanation for individual differences in noticing (Simons & Jensen, 2009). For 
example, individual differences in both trait and state emotion affect attention to and processing 
of emotional information. Negative affect and depression bias attention toward and improve 
memory for negative information (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010; Crocker et al., 2012). Such 
individual biases might also influence the detection of unexpected negative information—in 
effect, negative information falls within the attention set of people with negative affect or 
depression, so an unexpected and emotionally negative stimulus might be more noticeable to 
them. 
 Individual differences in emotional processing could also influence processing of non-
emotional information (e.g., Derakshan & Eysenck, 2009). For example, depression is associated 
with diminished ability to think or concentrate (APA, 2000), meaning that trait and state 
psychological distress could influence noticing by altering attention control processes. In some 
ways, depression induces impairments akin to multitasking, leading to decreased attention 
capture by an abruptly appearing unexpected item (Bredemeier et al. 2012; Boot, Brockmole, & 
Simons, 2005; Lavie & DeFockert, 2005). 
 Anxiety also might affect the detection of unexpected events by increasing 
responsiveness to potential threats (Heller, 1993; Nitschke, Heller, & Miller, 2001). Anxiety can 
be distinguished from anhedonic depression and further decomposed into worry and anxious 
arousal (Nitschke, Heller, & Miller, 2000; Engels et al., 2007; Engels et al., 2010). Each of these 
dimensions is associated with differences in cognition. Anxious arousal is associated with 
increased vigilance and enhanced attention to both sides of space as well as with increased 
activity in right posterior brain regions specialized for visual and spatial information processing 
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(Heller, Etienne, & Miller, 1995). In contrast, worry is associated with increased verbal 
rumination and accompanying left prefrontal activation (Engels et al., 2007; 2010; Heller, 
Nitschke, Etienne, & Miller, 1997). Consequently, anxious arousal in particular might predict 
better detection of unexpected objects. 
 The idea that anxious arousal might affect noticing is consistent with models in which 
anxiety modulates the balance between top-down and bottom-up attentional systems —anxiety 
increases the influence of stimulus-driven attention and decreases the influence of goal-directed 
attention (Eysenck et al., 2007; Derakshan & Eysenck, 2009). Given that people are less likely to 
notice unexpected objects falling outside the scope of their attention set (Most et al, 2005)—
objects that are excluded from the focus of attention—a reduction in the contribution of goal-
directed attention should increase the probability of noticing unexpected objects that fall outside 
the observer’s attention set. For people higher in anxious arousal, an unexpected object still 
should affect stimulus-driven processing but should not be as inhibited by top-down attention 
sets.  
 Although neither worry nor anxious arousal affects attention capture by an expected, 
task-irrelevant stimulus (Bredemeier et al, 2012), the effect of these personality variables on 
noticing of unexpected objects remains unclear. In one study, people with high anxiety were 
more likely to detect an unexpected object, but only when it had a negative valence (i.e. 
frowning face) and appeared in a stress condition (Lee & Telch, 2008). No studies have explored 
the effects of anxiety on inattention for emotionally neutral stimuli.  
 Even if these dimensions of psychopathology do not predict noticing of unexpected 
objects, affective traits might. A growing literature links negative affect—a hallmark feature of 
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depression and anxiety, although distinct from them theoretically and empirically (Crocker et al., 
2012)—to impairments in cognitive control. For example, trait negative affect is associated with 
facilitated automatic orienting of attention (Wallace & Newman, 1997) and impaired controlled 
or self-regulated attention. A tendency to be fearful (trait fear) might engage a stronger cognitive 
and physiological threat response than would anxious arousal. If so, it might be more likely to 
modulate inattentional blindness.  
In addition to affect traits (fear) and dimensions of psychopathology (anxious arousal, 
worry, and depression), other personality differences thought to influence attention include 
mindfulness, attention control, and affective control. People with dispositional mindfulness 
purportedly spread attention more broadly and are more attentive to the present. If so, they might 
devote less attention to the primary task (e.g., tracking objects) and more to the surrounding 
context. They might also have a default attention set to focus more on context. Either could 
increase the likelihood of detecting unexpected objects. Individual differences in attention 
control, or the ability to regulate attention and maintain vigilance when performing the primary 
task, might also affect noticing. Finally, affective control might influence noticing by increasing 
the likelihood that emotions will intrude on awareness, thereby affecting attention to the primary 
task.   
 To the extent that noticing of unexpected objects is reduced by top-down attention sets, 
anxious arousal might lead to greater detection of unexpected objects by virtue of the reduced 
influence of goal-directed attention. However, individual differences in goal-directed and 
stimulus-driven attention associated with anxiety might only influence the processing of 
expected stimuli. Other cognitive factors such as working memory capacity predict noticing of 
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task-irrelevant, expected stimuli but do not reliably predict noticing of unexpected stimuli. By 
this view, anxiety might modulate performance of a primary, attention-demanding task (e.g., 
object tracking) even if it has no effect on detection of unexpected objects. This view is 
consistent with the idea that individual differences in cognitive ability do not predict the 
detection of unexpected objects (Simons & Jensen, 2009; Bredemeier & Simons, 2012). 
 In this study, we explored whether individual differences in psychopathology and trait 
affect influence predict noticing of an unexpected object. Specifically, we examined whether 
noticing was predicted by (a) dimensions of psychopathology (anhedonic depression, anxious 
arousal, and worry), (b) state and trait affect, and (c) measures of mindfulness, attention control, 
and affective control. By examining which (if any) of these variables predict noticing, we can 
better determine the reasons for individual differences in noticing.   
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METHODS 
Participants 
 603 undergraduates at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign participated in the 
study for course credit. Of those, 505 (30.9% male, Age range: 18-23 years, Mean age = 18.9, 
SD = 1.1) successfully completed all of the tasks and were included in analyses. All participants 
reported having normal or corrected-to-normal vision.  
Materials  
Inattentional blindness task 
 Participants completed a sustained inattentional blindness task based on Most et al. 
(2001). On each trial, four white and four black letters (Ls and Ts) moved independently at a 
fixed speed (4.32°/second) in a gray rectangular display window (640x480) centered on the 
screen. Participants were instructed to count the total number of times the four white shapes 
touched the sides of the window while ignoring touches by the black shapes. Each trial lasted 
approximately 8200ms, and participants then were prompted to type the number of touches they 
had counted.  
 On the fifth trial, after 3 seconds of object motion, a gray cross entered the display 
window on the right, passed linearly across the middle of the display at the same movement rate 
as the other items, and exited on the left.  The gray cross was visible for 4.7 seconds, and after it 
disappeared, the other objects continued moving for 500 ms (see Figure 1).  
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 On this “critical” trial, after entering the number of touches, participants were asked “Did 
you notice anything other than the Ls and Ts on that last trial?” A “no” response ended the 
experiment. Following a “yes” response, participants were asked to type a description of what 
they had seen.  Those who reported that they did not notice anything unexpected were considered 
to have experienced inattentional blindness. Those who were able to report at least one feature of 
the unexpected object (shape, color, direction of motion) were considered to have noticed it.  
 For each trial, tracking accuracy was considered correct if counts were within 20% above 
or below the actual number of bounces (see Bredemeier & Simons, 2012 for more method 
details). Other cases were considered as incorrect. The percentage of the first four trials with 
correct counting was used as an index of primary task performance.  
Personality Measures  
 Table 1 lists the self-report questionnaires used to measure individual differences in state 
and trait affect and attention and emotion control (in the order they were administered).   
We used the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule-Expanded Form (PANAS-X; Watson 
& Clark, 1994) to measure trait negative affect (NA), trait positive affect (PA), and trait fear. In 
this measure, participants indicated the extent to which they experienced 13 negative emotions 
(e.g., afraid, nervous, irritable, upset) and 10 positive emotions (e.g., interested, excited, active, 
inspired) emotions during the previous few weeks on a scale from 1 (“very slightly or not at all”) 
to 5 (“extremely”). Out of 13 negative emotion items, ten of the negative emotion items were 
used as a measure of negative affect and six were used to measure trait fear (i.e., afraid, scared, 
frightened, nervous, jittery, shaky). Three items (i.e., afraid, scared, jittery) were used for both 
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negative affect and fear. State fear, state negative affect (NA), and state positive affect (PA) were 
measured using the same items and scale but with a different instruction (i.e., “Indicate to what 
extent you feel this way right now”). This measure was administered immediately before 
participants performed the sustained attention task.   
Procedures 
 Participants were tested in a computer lab accommodating groups of up to 24 people. All 
participants completed the trait and state PANAS first, followed by the inattention blindness 
computer task and then by the remaining questionnaires. 
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RESULTS 
 Ten participants were excluded from analyses due to computer error (n=2) or reporting 
the unexpected object but describing it inaccurately (n=8). Of the remaining 495 participants, 
229 (46.3%) noticed and accurately described the unexpected cross, a rate of inattentional 
blindness consistent with other studies using the same task (e.g., Most et al, 2001; Bredemeier & 
Simons, 2012).  
 We conducted a correlation analysis between inattentional blindness and individual 
differences measures (Table 2). We found a trend for greater noticing by participants who 
performed the touch-counting task more accurately (p=.084). Given the number of separate 
predictors tested in this analysis, coupled with the lack of evidence for such an effect of tracking 
accuracy in other studies (e.g., Most et al, 2001; Bredemeier & Simons, 2012), that marginal 
result should be interpreted with caution. Strikingly, not one of our other measures individually 
predicted noticing, despite an adequately large sample size and a power to detect even a small 
effect size (i.e., 99% power to detect an odds ratio as small as 0.7).  
 Although none of the measures individually predicted noticing, perhaps they account for 
different sources of variance, and collectively can predict noticing. To test that possibility, we 
included all of the predictors in a single logistic regression to predict noticing. Even with all of 
the predictors, the model did not account for significant variability in noticing (Nagelkerke R2 = 
.036, p=.332). Using all of the predictors only increased the ability to predict noticing from 
53.7% with no predictors to 57% with all of the individual differences measures included in the 
model. 
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DISCUSSION 
 The Present findings showed that none of the measures associated with psychopathology 
(i.e., anxious arousal, worry, and depression), trait affect, and perceived control of cognition and 
emotion, predicted noticing of an unexpected, non-emotional object. Although the current result 
is not consistent with initial hypotheses, this result has significant implications, especially given 
that the study was well powered to detect even a small effect size. 
 The current results cast two possible interpretations. First, in parallel with the idea that 
cognitive functions only modulate the processing of task-relevant, expected stimuli while 
exerting no effect on detecting unexpected objects (Simon & Jensen, 2009), dimensions of 
psychopathology, personality and affective traits might also only influence the processing of 
task-relevant stimuli, not task irrelevant, unexpected stimuli. Although emotional distress 
measures, such as anxiety and depression, and other personality measures (e.g., trait affectivity) 
are associated with attention control deficits, they do not appear to be directly linked to the 
likelihood of noticing unexpected, but emotionally neutral objects. Taken together, the current 
results suggest that there might be distinct processes involved in the ability to process task-
relevant, expected stimuli and ignore known distractors and the ability to detect task-irrelevant, 
unexpected stimuli.  Thus, the individual differences associated with executive attention or 
attentional control (e.g., cognitive ability, emotional and personality variables) would not 
necessarily predict “stimulus-driven attention capture” by an unexpected object falling outside of 
the focus of attention. 
As another interpretation, results of the current study indicate that individual differences 
in psychopathology and trait affect did not influence the processing of a task-irrelevant, 
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unexpected stimulus that had no emotional significance.  Combined with previous research that 
suggested the influence of “attentional set” on processing relevant information (e.g., Lee & 
Telch, 2008), it is possible that individual differences in emotional trait and state measures would 
only affect attention to and processing of emotional information by possibly altering the attention 
control process (e.g., top-down and bottom-up attention), but do not influence the processing of a 
neutral, unexpected object because the neutral, unexpected objects did not fall under their 
“emotional attentional set.” Thus, this interpretation emphasizes that attentional capture by the 
unexpected is contingent on the person's prior attentional set (e.g., Folk et al., 1992). 
 Although both top-down, executive attention control and bottom-up, stimulus-driven 
attention capture influence how attention is distributed, the mechanisms responsible for each 
attention system seem to be distinct and thus elicit a differential relationship to different 
individual difference measures (cognitive ability, emotion, personality). Thus, training people on 
the primary task and increasing their ability to focus their attention on a given task would not 
necessarily help advance their ability to detect unexpected objects as long as the attributes of the 
object fall outside of the attentional set previously determined. In a similar way, people should 
not be discriminated against for the work that primarily involves attention capture (e.g., finding 
an unexpected error in the data set) due to cognitive and emotional characteristics relevant to 
focused, executive attention.  
 Given the current results, further investigation on this subject matter is warranted. First, 
although the current study showed that none of the state affect measures predicted noticing of 
emotionally neutral stimuli, a future study using a more potent indicator for the influence of state 
emotion, such as mood manipulation, is warranted. Furthermore, given that our sample is 
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exclusively with college students who tend to show a limited range of psychopathology or 
emotional distress level, future research should be done using a clinical population with 
diagnosable disorders in order to have a wider range of psychopathology measures. Lastly, given 
that neither of the cognitive or emotional dimensions themselves predicts noticing, the influence 
of an interactive effect of cognitive and emotional endogenous features on noticing an 
unexpected object can be investigated. 
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TABLES 
Table 1. Self-report Questionnaire List 
Task Order  
Construct 
Self-report 
questionnaire  
Reference 
1 
Trait Negative 
Affect, Positive 
Affect, & Fear 
Positive and 
Negative Affect 
Schedule-Expanded 
Form (PANAS-X) 
Watson & Clark, 1994 
2 
State Negative 
Affect, Positive 
Affect, & Fear 
Positive and 
Negative Affect 
Schedule-Expanded 
Form (PANAS-X)  
Watson & Clark, 1994 
Inattention Blindness Task (Most et al., 2001) 
3 Worry PSWQ Meyer et al., 1990 
4 Anxious Arousal MASQ Watson et al., 1995 
5 Anhedonic 
Depression 
MASQ Watson et al., 1995 
6 
Attention Control 
Attention Control 
Scale 
Derryberry & Reed, 2002 
7 
Mindfulness 
Mindful Attention 
Awareness Scale 
Brown & Ryan, 2003 
8 
Affective Control 
Affective Control 
Scale 
Williams & Chambless, 1997 
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Table 2. Zero-order correlations between variables 
               
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1.PSWQ 1              
2.MASQAA .22** 1             
3.MSSQAD .36** .26** 1            
4.Trait NA .39** .43** .52** 1           
5.Trait PA -.25** -.081 -.67** -.28** 1          
6.Trait Fear .37** .45** .41** .83** -.20** 1         
7.State NA .30** .33** .32** .57** -.16** .49** 1        
8.State PA -.14** -.02 -.44** -.10* .58** -.043 .06 1       
9.State Fear .31** .37** .30** .52** -.16** .58** .83** .06 1      
10.MAAS -.09* -.08 -.15** -.12** .13** -.14** -.02 .16** -.03 1     
11.AttentionCtrl  -.33** -.27** -.36** -.40** .30** -.35** -.27** .21** -.27** .33** 1    
12.Affective Ctrl .49** .35** .52** .48** -.34** .44** .33** -.16** .35** -.09* -.40** 1   
13.TrackingAccuracy -.03 -.01 -.01 -.02 .02 -.09 -.02 .03 -.05 -.06 .03 -.03 1  
14. Noticing -.02 .01 -.03 -.04 .03 -.07 -.03 .01 -.05 -.01 .07 -.01 .08 1 
Note: *p<.05; **p<.01.  
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics and Logistic Regression Results (predicting whether noticed or 
not) 
 Descriptive 
Statistics 
Logistic Regression Results 
Predictors Mean 
SD 
Range 
β  
(S.E.) 
Wald Statistics P-Value 
 For 
Noticers 
For Non-
noticers 
Only one 
variable 
in the 
model  
All 13  
variables 
included 
in the 
model 
Only one 
variable 
in the 
model  
All 13  
variables 
included 
in the 
model 
Only one 
variable 
in the 
model  
All 13  
variables 
included 
in the 
model 
PSWQ 51.19 
14.80 
17-78 
51.74 
14.27 
16-80 
-.00  
(.01) 
.00 
(.01) 
0.18 0.04 0.67 0.84 
MASQAA 27.58 
8.75 
17-70 
27.34 
8.64 
14-69 
.00  
(.01) 
.01 
(.01) 
0.10 1.22 0.76 0.27 
MSSQAD 55.17 
13.81 
25-101 
55.97 
13.92 
26-103 
-.00 
 (.01) 
-.00 
(.01) 
0.42 0.03 0.52 0.87 
Trait NA 21.92 
5.99 
10-43 
22.45 
6.35 
10-40 
-.01 
 (.02) 
.01 
(.03) 
0.90 0.12 0.34 0.74 
Trait PA 31.86 
6.50 
13-49 
31.53 
6.51 
14-48 
.01  
(.01) 
.00 
(.02) 
0.32 0.00 0.57 0.97 
Trait Fear 12.27 
4.03 
6-28 
12.82 
4.46 
6-26 
-.03  
(.02) 
-.04 
(.04) 
2.09 0.93 0.15 0.33 
State NA 15.24 
5.14 
10-33 
15.61 
5.95 
10-44 
-.01 
 (.02) 
.01 
(.03) 
0.53 0.02 0.47 0.89 
State PA 23.45 
8.29 
10-48 
23.27 
7.38 
10-43 
.00  
(.01) 
.00 
(.02) 
0.07 0.00 0.80 0.99 
State Fear 8.57 
3.07 
6-21 
8.91 
3.81 
6-27 
-.03  
(.03) 
-.02 
(.05) 
1.12 0.12 0.29 0.73 
MAAS 29.28 
5.16 
18-61 
29.35 
6.93 
16-73 
-.03  
(.22) 
-.16 
(.24) 
0.02 0.42 0.90 0.52 
Attention 
Control  
50.12 
7.82 
30-73 
48.98 
8.16 
27-72 
.02  
(.01) 
.02 
(.01) 
2.47 2.25 0.12 0.13 
Affective 
Control 
32.42 
7.53 
16-57 
32.62 
7.40 
15-57 
-.00  
(.01) 
.01 
(.02) 
0.09 0.25 0.77 0.62 
Tracking 
Accuracy 
.46 
.27 
0-1 
.42 
.27 
0-1 
.59  
(.34) 
.51 
(.35) 
2.97 2.16 0.09 0.14 
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FIGURES 
Regular (multiple-object tracking) trials 
 
Critical (inattentional blindness) trial 
 
Figure 1: Static illustrations of the inattentional blindness task 
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FOOTNOTE 
 Although tracking accuracy on the critical trial significantly predicted noticing (p=.037), 
it is unclear how to interpret this result because the act of noticing the unexpected object could 
disrupt tracking performance. Therefore, critical tracking accuracy might be a consequence 
rather than a predictor of noticing. For that reason, we excluded critical trial tracking accuracy 
from subsequent analyses. 
 
